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ABSTRACT
The carry trade is the investment strategy of going long in high-yield target currencies and short in
low-yield funding currencies. Recently, this naive trade has seen very high returns for long periods,
followed by large crash losses after large depreciations of the target currencies. Based on low Sharpe
ratios and negative skew, these trades could appear unattractive, even when diversified across many
currencies. But more sophisticated conditional trading strategies exhibit more favorable payoffs. We
apply novel (within economics) binary-outcome classification tests to show that our directional trading
forecasts are informative, and out-of-sample loss-function analysis to examine trading performance.
The critical conditioning variable, we argue, is the fundamental equilibrium exchange rate (FEER).
Expected returns are lower, all else equal, when the target currency is overvalued. Like traders, researchers
should incorporate this information when evaluating trading strategies. When we do so, some questions
are resolved: negative skewness is purged, and market volatility (VIX) is uncorrelated with returns;














amtaylor@ucdavis.eduOnce a relatively obscure corner of international nance, the na ve carry trade (borrowing in low
interest rate currencies and investing in high interest rate currencies, despite the exchange rate
risk) has drawn increasing attention in recent years, within and beyond academe, and especially
as the volume of carry trade activity multiplied astronomically.
Inevitably, press attention has often focused on the personal angle and episodes of nancial
implosion. In 2007, The New York Times reported on the disastrous losses suered by the \FX
Beauties" club and other Japanese retail investors during an episode of yen appreciation; one
highly-leveraged housewife lost her family's entire life savings within a week.1 By the fall of 2008
attention was grabbed by an even more brutal squeeze on carry traders from bigger yen moves|
e.g., up 60% against the AUD over 2 months, and up 30% against GBP (including 10% moves
against both in ve hours on the morning of October 24). Money managers on the wrong side saw
their funds blowing up, supporting the June 2007 prediction of Jim O'Neill, chief global economist
at Goldman Sachs, who had said of the carry trade that \there are going to be dead bodies around
when this is over."2
But for the dismal science, a market crash can be celebrated as an ill wind. Persistent carry
trade prots in the 2002{2007 period appeared to strike at the core of the ecient market hy-
pothesis (EMH) until the nancial collapse of 2008 restored a modicum of credibility by exploding
many seemingly protable strategies.3 Still, we think caution is needed in the interpretation of
the recent carry trade era. Our paper uncovers more sophisticated carry trade strategies that
would have escaped the debacle of 2008 largely unscathed, once more reigniting the debate about
whether such prot opportunities can be reconciled with standard models of risk adjustment.
Our paper is not the only recent contribution to a new carry trade literature, and joins a
resurgent debate on the carry trade which revisits many old questions: Are there returns to
currency speculation? Are the returns predictable? Is there a failure of market eciency? We
are still far from a consensus, but the present state of the literature, how it got there, and how
it relates to the interpretations of the current market turmoil, can be summarized in a just few
moments, so to speak.4
The rst point concerns the rst moment of returns. There have been on average positive
returns to na ve carry trade strategies for long periods.5 Put another way, the standard nding
1 Martin Fackler, \Japanese Housewives Sweat in Secret as Markets Reel," New York Times, September 16,
2007.
2 Ambrose Evans Pritchard. \Goldman Sachs Warns of `Dead Bodies' after Market Turmoil," Daily Telegraph,
June 3, 2007.
3 See, for example, Richard Thaler in \Eciency and beyond," The Economist, July 16th, 2009.
4 For a full survey of foreign exchange market eciency see Chapter 2 in Sarno and Taylor (2002), on which we
draw here.
5 We prefer to focus on the period of unfettered arbitrage in the current era nancial globalization|that is,
from the mid 1980s on, for major currencies. Staring in the 1960s the growth of the Eurodollar markets had
permitted oshore currency arbitrage to develop. Given the increasingly porous nature of the Bretton Woods era
capital controls, and the tidal wave of nancial ow building up, the dams started to leak, setting the stage for
the trilemma to bite in the crisis of the Bretton Woods regime in 1970{73. Floating would permit capital account
liberalization, but the process was tful, and not until 1990s was the transition complete in Europe (Bakker and
Chapple 2002). Empirical evidence suggests signicant barriers of 100bps or more even to riskless arbitrage in the
1970s and even into the early 1980s (Frenkel and Levich 1975; Clinton 1988; Obstfeld and Taylor 2004). Taking
these frictions as evidence of imperfect capital mobility we prefer to exclude the 1970s and the early 1980s from our
empirical work. Other work, e.g. Burnside, Eichenbaum, Kleshchelski, and Rebelo (2008a,b) includes data back to
the the 1970s.
1of a \forward discount bias" in the short run means that exchange rate losses will not fully oset
the interest dierential gains of the na ve carry strategy.6 This nding is often misinterpreted as
a failure of uncovered interest parity; but UIP is an ex-ante, not an ex-post, condition|and the
evidence, albeit limited, shows that average ex-ante exchange rate expectations (e.g., from surveys
of traders) are not so far out of line with interest dierentials.7 Rather, expectations themselves
seem to be systematically wrong. In this view, ex-post prots appeared to be both predictable and
protable, contradicting the risk-neutral ecient markets hypothesis. Indeed, our paper builds on
this tradition using both regression and trading-algorithm approaches.8 However, over periods of
a decade or two it is quite dicult to reject ex-post UIP, suggesting that interest arbitrage holds
in the long run, and that the possible prot opportunities are a matter of timing.9
The second point concerns the second moment of returns. If positive ex-ante returns are not
arbitraged away, one way to rationalize them might be that they are simply too risky (volatile)
to attract additional investors who might bid them away. This explanation has much in common
with other nance puzzles, like the equity premium puzzle. The annual reward-to-variability ratio
or Sharpe ratio of the S&P 500, roughly 0.4, can be taken as a benchmark level of risk adjusted
return. But anecdotal evidence (see Lyons, 2001) suggests that many relevant marginal investors
(e.g., proprietary trading desks) have little interest in strategies with annual Sharpe ratios below
1, and it would be natural for this hurdle to apply to a currency strategy as well. Historical
data show that for all individual currency pairs, this hurdle has not been met using na ve carry
trade strategies. Obviously, diversication in a portfolio across many currency pairs can improve
performance, since returns on dierent currencies are not perfectly correlated. But even then, the
data show that the hurdle of 1 is hard to beat in the long run for the G10 universe of currencies.
Thus, the seemingly excess returns to the na ve carry strategy may be explicable, at least in part,
as compensation for volatility.10
Finally, we turn to the third point of near consensus, on the third moment of returns. Na ve
carry trade returns are negatively skewed. The lower-tail risk means that trades are subject
to a risk of pronounced periodic crashes|what is often referred to as a peso problem. Such a
6 Seminal studies of the forward discount puzzle include Frankel (1980), Bilson (1981), Fama (1984), Froot and
Thaler (1990), and Bekaert and Hodrick (1993).
7 Seminal works on survey expectations include Dominguez (1986) and Froot and Frankel (1987, 1989). For an
update see Chinn and Frankel (2002).
8 A standard test of the predictability of returns (the \semi-strong" form of market eciency) is to regress
returns on an ex ante information set. The seminal work is Hansen and Hodrick (1980). Other researchers deploy
simple protable trading rules as evidence of market ineciency (Dooley and Shafer 1984; Levich and Thomas
1993; Engel and Hamilton 1990).
9 Support for long-run UIP was found using long bonds by Fujii and Chinn (2000) and Alexius (2001), and
using short rates by Sinclair (2005).
10 It is an open question whether expanding the currency set to include minor currencies, exotics, and emerging
markets can add further diversication and so enhance the Sharpe ratio, or whether these benets will be oset
by illiquidity, trading costs, and high correlations/skew. Burnside, Eichenbaum, Kleshchelski and Rebelo (2006)
compute rst, second, and third moments for individual currencies and portfolio-based strategies for major cur-
rencies and some minor currencies. In major currencies the transaction costs associated with bid-ask spreads are
usually small, although 5{10 bps per trade can add up if an entire portfolio is churned every month (i.e., 60{120
bps annual). Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2007) explore emerging markets with adjustments for transaction
costs. Both studies conclude that there are prot opportunities net of such costs, but the Sharpe ratios are low.
Moreover, Sager and Taylor (2008) argue that the Burnside et al. returns and Sharpe ratios may be overstated.
Pursuing a dierent strategy, however, using information in the term structure, Sager and Taylor are able to attain
Sharpe ratios of 0.88 for a diversied basket of currencies in back testing.
2description applies to the aforementioned disaster events suered by yen carry traders in 2007 and
2008 (and their predecessors in 1998). However, many competing investments, like the S&P500, are
also negatively skewed, so the question is once more relative. And once again echoing the central
limit theorem, this time for higher moments, while individual currency pairs may exhibit high
skew, we know that diversication across currency pairs can be expected to drive down skewness
in a portfolio. But for na ve strategies some negative skew still remains under diversication, and
it is then unclear whether excess returns are a puzzle, or required compensation for skew (and/or
volatility).11
In light of the risk/return features of the carry trade, it seems desirable to articulate a formal
test of the EMH with currency data. However, a test of EMH is always a joint test involving
the correct model of risk adjustment and the correct statistical analysis of the data. Unfortu-
nately, there is still no consensus about what the true model of risk adjustment is.12 Thus, any
characterization of a risk/returns anomaly would be subject to the unveriable criticism that
investor preferences were inadequately modeled. For this reason, our paper focuses on the statis-
tical analysis part of the joint test, and nds that|however low a statistical hurdle might be|the
sophisticated carry trade strategies that we discuss appear to exhibit attractively high returns
and low risk, even throughout the turbulent period of the last half of 2008. A summary of the
contributions of our paper is as follows:
 We start from common ground and conrm the above ndings for our data; na ve carry
trades are protable but, even when diversied, they have low Sharpe ratios and negative
skew.13
 We show that an important explanatory variable has been omitted from inuential recent
studies; the deviation from the fundamental equilibrium exchange rate (FEER) is an impor-
tant predictor of exchange rates.14
 Moreover, carry returns may be better explained in a nonlinear model, and our preferred
nonlinear model draws together extant ideas from the UIP and PPP literature. The nonlinear
model's regimes weigh two signals, a \greed" factor (potential carry trade interest gains plus
momentum) and a \fear" factor (potential mean reversion to FEER).
11 Brunnermeier, Nagel and Pedersen (2008) focus on the \rare event" of crash risk as an explanation for carry
trade prots. Burnside, Eichenbaum, Kleshchelski, and Rebelo (2008a) argue that peso problems cannot explain
carry trade prots, although in a dierent version of the same paper (2008b), they argue to the contrary.
12 An example of this lack of consensus is the more recent and contentious use of consumption-based asset pricing
models in the carry trade context. Lustig and Verdelhan (2007) claimed that the relatively low na ve carry trade
returns may be explicable in a consumption-based model with reasonable parameters. Burnside (2007) challenged
the usefulness of this approach. Returns to our systematic trading rules have very dierent moments, however, with
mean returns twice as large as the typical na ve strategy, leaving a considerable premium to be explained in either
framework. See also Burnside, Eichenbaum, Kleshchelski, and Rebelo (2006) who nd no correlation between their
carry trade returns and a wide range of typical \risk factors" used in nance.
13 Note that throughout this article we implicitly assume that the end investor dislikes negative skew, all else
equal. Of course, due to well known principal-agent problems arising from asymmetric compensation structures,
asset managers may be quite happy to embrace large negative skew if they can obtain larger returns and associated
performance fees in the short run before their fund blows up.
14 Bilson (1984) is an early example where PPP was proposed as a forecasting model.
3 Inclusion of the FEER control variable improves not only the statistical performance of the
model, it also enhances the nancial performance of trading rules based on the model, and
much more so than diversication alone. For simplicity and comparability we apply the
model to equal-weight portfolio strategies among G10 currencies, a standard backtesting
laboratory. Trading on a long-short directional signal for each currency we achieve Sharpe
ratios well in excess of 1 over long periods, and attain zero or even positive skew.
 To support the claim that our directional forecasts beat a coin toss or rival strategies like
na ve carry, we do out-of-sample testing using innovative loss functions (Giacomini and
White 2006). We also employ (as far as we know, for the rst time in economics) a set of
powerful tools that have been widely used in other elds, such as medical statistics: the
receiver operating characteristic curve, or ROC curve, and its associated hypothesis tests.
For applications in nance we apply an extension of the ROC curve, called ROC* (Jord a
and Taylor 2009), which allows for directional predictions to be weighted by returns, in the
spirit of gain-loss performance measures (Bernardo and Ledoit 2000).
 We also compare our approach to rival crash protection strategies. One suggestion is that
carry trade skew is driven by market stress and liquidity events (Brunnermeier et al. 2008);
but we nd that VIX signals provide no additional explanatory or predictive power in our
preferred forecasting framework. Another approach suggests that options provide a way to
hedge downside risk (Burnside, Eichenbaum, Kleshchelski, and Rebelo, 2008ab); but these
strategies are very costly to implement compared to our trading rule.
 Finally we perform out-of-sample tests and explore real-world trading strategies for the years
up to and including the 2008 nancial crisis, looking at our model performance and actual
exchange traded funds. The na ve models and crude ETFs crashed horribly in 2008, wiping
out years of gains. More sophisticated ETFs resembling our preferred model weathered the
storm remarkably well with barely any drawdown.
To conclude, we nd that in the past, whilst na ve carry strategies may not have oered
adequate compensation for risk (volatility and skew), more sophisticated strategies that accounted
for long-run real exchange rate fundamentals could have easily surmounted that hurdle. This
provides support for currency strategies that augment carry and momentum signals with a value
signal based on real fundamentals. Many sophisticated funds with limited access have pursued
such strategies in the past, but the recent arrival of simple, passive ETFs with these same features
raises the issue of how much \true alpha" active currency managers create. It also begs the
question how long any such excess returns might persist before being arbitraged away.15
In addition to extending a growing literature on the nature of carry trade dynamics, our paper
also provides a touchstone for ongoing theoretical work that attempts to characterize the form
and extent of deviations from the ecient markets hypothesis. Our work is sympathetic to a
15 Pojarliev and Levich (2007, 2008) argue that active managers deliver less alpha than claimed, and that much
of their returns can be described as quasi-beta with respect to style factors like carry, momentum, and value that
are now captured in passive indices and funds.
4well-established view that asset prices can deviate from their fundamental value for some time,
before a \snap back" occurs (Poterba and Summers 1986; Plantin and Shin 2007). Recent theory
has focused on what might permit the deviation, and what then triggers the snap. In FX markets,
work in this vein includes models of noise traders, heterogeneous beliefs, rational inattention,
liquidity constraints, nancial stress, herding, \behavioral" eects, and other factors that may
serve to limit arbitrage (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Jeanne and Rose 2002; Baccheta and van
Wincoop 2006; Fisher 2006; Brunnermeier et al. 2008; Ilut 2008; Melvin and M. P. Taylor 2009).
1 Statistical Design
Our primary objectives are to investigate the dynamic links between the excess returns to carry
trade and deviations from FEER; to generate forecasts with which to construct out-of-sample
formal predictive evaluation; and hence to construct carry trade strategies whose out-of-sample
returns can be evaluated for protability and risk.
The data for the analysis consists of a panel of nine countries (Australia, Canada, Germany,
Japan, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom) set against the
U.S. over the period January 1986 to December, 2008, observed at a monthly frequency (i.e., the
\G10" sample).16 The variables in this data-set include the end-of-month nominal exchange rate
expressed in U.S. dollars per foreign currency units and whose logarithm we denote as et; the
one-month London interbank oered rates (LIBOR) denoted as it for the U.S. and i
t for any of
the nine counterparty countries; and the consumer price index, whose logarithm is denoted as pt
for the U.S. and p
t otherwise. Data on exchange rates and the consumer price index are obtained
from the IFS database whereas data on LIBOR are obtained from the British Banker's Association
(www.bba.org.uk) and Global Financial Data (globalnacialdata.com).
The primary variable of interest to us can be thought of as momentum, denoted mt: Momentum
refers to the ex-post nominal excess returns of a carry trade, specically approximated by
mt+1 = et+1 + (i
t   it): (1)
In the absence of barriers or limits to arbitrage, and assuming that the ecient markets hypothesis
(EMH) holds, the ex-ante value of momentum for the next month should be zero at any time t,
that is Etmt+1 = Etet+1 + (i
t   it) = 0:
Momentum can also be expressed in terms of real excess returns as
mt+1 = qt+1 + (r
t   rt) (2)
where rt = it   t+1 with t+1 = pt+1; and similarly for r
t and 
t+1; and is qt+1 = q + et+1 +
(p





and the equivalence between (1) and (2) is readily apparent. Under the assumption of (weak)
purchasing power parity, q is the mean FEER to which qt reverts, so qt q is a stationary variable
16 Data for the Germany after 1999 are constructed with the EUR/USD exchange rate and the xed conversion
rate of 1.95583 DEM/EUR.
5and hence a valid cointegrating term. In a more general setting, and in the out-of-sample analysis
below, q may be time varying, when there is drift in the FEER due to productivity eects or other
factors.
The dynamic interactions between nominal exchange rates, ination and nominal interest rate
deviations are the constituent elements of a system whose linear combinations explain the dynamic













Under the assumption of purchasing power parity, et+1 and (p
t+1   pt+1) may be I(1) variables,
but they are cointegrated; therefore, a natural representation of the dynamics of yt+1 in (3) is
with a vector error correction model (VECM). Although including (i
t  it) in expression (3) may
appear peculiar because it is information known at time t+1; expression (3) focuses on forecasting
mt+1 with the specication for the rst equation in the VECM for yt+1:
2 A Trading Laboratory for the Carry Trade
This section investigates the econometric properties of the returns to the carry trade and for this
reason, it is legitimate to use the full sample of available data. Once we establish the elementary
features of the problem, the next section proceeds with the \gold standard" of formal out-of-sample
predictive ability evaluation for the set of competing carry trade strategies.
2.1 Statistical Properties of Exchange Rates and FEER
Our forecasting model hinges on the error correction representation of the equation for et in
the system of expression (3), where we take qt+1 = q + et+1 + (p
t+1   pt+1) to be a cointegrating
term.18 A natural impulse is to determine the stationarity properties of the constituent elements
of expression (3) so as to verify that qt+1 is a proper cointegrating term. Such steps are natural
when the objective of the analysis is to directly examine whether purchasing power parity holds in
the data; when one is interested in determining the speed of adjustment to long-run equilibrium;
and hence to ensure that the estimators and inference are constructed with the appropriate non-
standard asymptotic machinery. However interesting it is to investigate these issues, they are of
second order importance for our analysis given our stated focus on predictive ability and derivation
of protable investment strategies|the Beveridge-Nelson representation of the rst equation in
expression (3) is valid regardless of whether there is cointegration. For this reason, we provide a
far less extensive analysis of these issues for our panel data than is customary and refer the reader
to the extensive literature on panel PPP testing (e.g., see Taylor and Taylor 2004).
17 It would be straightforward to augment this model with an order-ow element, as in the VAR system of Froot
and Ramadorai (2005).
18 Note that in all estimations in this paper, q is absorbed in country specic intercept terms, so we are testing
relative PPP not absolute PPP.
6Table 1: Panel Cointegration Tests
Constant Constant + Trend
Raw Demeaned Raw Demeaned








 0.034 {0.56 0.340 {1.78
 0.079
PP {1.59 0.113 1.68
 0.097 {1.09 0.220 {1.71
 0.093
ADF 0.99 0.245 {0.54 0.345 1.27 0.179 {0.39 0.370
Group
 {0.51 0.350 {1.71
 0.092 0.48 0.356 {2.12
 0.042
PP {0.98 0.246 {1.65 0.103 {0.40 0.368 {2.06
 0.048
ADF 7.31
 0.000 0.59 0.335 7.16
 0.0009 0.74 0.303
Notes: We use the same denitions of each test as in Pedroni (1999). The tests are residual-based. We
consider tests with constant term and no trend, and with constant and time trend. The rst 4 rows
describe tests that pool along the within-dimension whereas the last 3 rows describe tests that pool along
the between-dimension. The tests allow for heterogeneity in the cointegrating vectors, the dynamics of
the error process and across cross-sectional units. ** indicates rejection of the null of no-cointegration at
the 5% level, or * 10% level. The sample is January 1986 to December 2008.
Instead, we investigate the properties of qt+1 directly with a battery of cointegration tests
that pool the data to improve the power of the tests (while accounting for dierent forms of
heterogeneity in cross-section units) and based on Pedroni (1999, 2004). The results of these tests
are summarized in Table 1, with the particulars of each test explained therein. Broadly speaking,
while not overwhelming, it seems reasonable to conclude that the data support our thinking of
qt+1 as a valid cointegrating error-correction term.
While the results of Table 1 are informative regarding the relative strength of PPP, we will
show momentarily that there is valuable predictive information contained in real exchange rate
fundamentals for use in one period-ahead forecasts, which might form the basis of a trading
strategy. Hence, we try various forecasting models, from na ve models (e.g., simple carry trades)
to more sophisticated models (e.g., nonlinear models of UIP and PPP dynamics). The models
are then evaluated in two ways: rst from a statistical standpoint, by looking at the in-sample
t and out-of-sample predictive power; and second from a trading standpoint, by examining how
implementing these strategies would have aected a currency manager's returns, volatility, Sharpe
ratios, and skewness for the sample period.
2.2 Two Na ve Models
Table 2 presents the one-month ahead forecasts of the change in the log nominal exchange rate
based on two na ve models. Model 1, denoted \Na ve," imposes the assumption that the exchange
rate follows a random walk. All regressors are omitted so there is, in fact, no estimated model.
This is simply the benchmark or null model. However crude it may be, this is still a model that
one might use as a basis for a hypothetical trading strategy.19 The trading strategy is long high
19 In the real world, investors would not trade only at a monthly frequency; they would be concerned about
drawdowns, and would probably augment any strategy with stop-loss behavior. We abstract from these issues.
7Table 2: Two Na ve Models
Model (1) (2)
Na ve Na ve ECM
(a) Model parameters
Dependent variable ejt ejt
qjt    qj | -0.0235**
(0.0047)
R
2, within - .0119
F | F(1,2447) = 25.39
Fixed eects | Yes
Periods 276 276
Currencies (relative to US$) 9 9
Observations 2484 2484
(b) Trading performance y
Predicted prots
Mean 0.0022 0.0029










Std. dev. 0.0299 0.0298
Skewness -0.6743 -0.0043
C.v. 11.3310 8.9930
y Statistics for trading prots are net, monthly, pooled.
Note: C.v. = coecient of variation = ratio of standard deviation to mean. Standard errors in parentheses;
** (*) denotes signicant at the 95% (90%) condence level. Estimation is by ordinary least squares. In
column (1), there is no model estimation as coecients are assumed to be zero and e follows a random
walk.
yield, short low yield (i.e., based on the sign of the signal which is the interest dierential)|so
panels (b){(d) explore the performance characteristics of the pooled set of trades based on such
a strategy, for all 9 currencies against the U.S. dollar and all 276 months (2484 observations). In
pooled data here, and below, the index j denotes the non-U.S. currency, and t the month.
The ndings are as expected. Average predicted prots for all trades (all currencies, all months)
are about 20 basis points (bps) per month, positively skewed, but with a similar standard deviation.
Monthly forecast errors are a serious problem, with a large standard deviation of 300 bps, and a
large negative skew of  0:73 due to \rare event" crashes. As a result actual trading prots are
26 bps per month, with a standard deviation of 300 bps|implying a truly awful monthly Sharpe
ratio of less than 0.1. The pooled trades also have a serious negative skew of  0:67.
Model 2, denoted \Na ve ECM," augments the Na ve model: we embrace the idea that real
exchange rate fundamentals may have predictive power, in that currencies overvalued (underval-
ued) relative to FEER might be expected to face depreciation (appreciation) pressure. Now in
panel (a) the one-month-ahead forecast equation has just a single, lone time-varying regressor,
8the lagged real exchange rate deviation, plus currency-specic xed eects which are not shown.
The coecient on the real exchange rate term of  0:02 is statistically signicant and indicates
that reversion to FEER occurs at a convergence speed of about 2% per month, which implies that
deviations have a half-life of 36 months|well within the consensus range of the PPP literature.
In panel (b) the potential virtues of a FEER based trading approach start to emerge, but only
weakly. From a trader's perspective, the results are little better with Model 2: forecast prots are
higher and more positively skewed. But we also see the ipside: forecast errors are smaller and
the negative skew of the error is reduced, although it is still an irksome  0:37. Thus, although
pooled actual ex-post returns in Model 2 have the same mean and volatility (and hence the same
feeble Sharpe ratio) as in Model 1, their skewness has been cut from  0:73 to  0:37: a gain, if
only a modest one.
By focusing mainly on unconditional na ve carry trade returns, some inuential academic
papers have concluded that crash risk and peso problems are important features of the FX market.
Table 2 may be extremely na ve, but it suces to launch the start of a counterargument. It
shows that an allowance for real exchange rate fundamentals can limit adverse skewness from
the carry trade, and it is indeed well known that successful strategies do just that, as we shall
see in a moment. However, we do not stop here, since we have the tools to explore superior
model specications that deliver trading strategies with even higher ex post actual returns, lower
volatilities, and negligible (or positive) skew.
2.3 Two Linear Models
Table 3 displays the one-month-ahead forecasts from the richer exible-form exchange rate models
discussed in the previous section. Model 3 is based on a regression of the change in the nominal
exchange rate on the rst lag of the change in the nominal exchange rate, ination, and the interest
rate dierentials (this model is labeled VAR since it would correspond to the rst equation of a
vector autoregressive model for yt+1 in expression 3). Model 4 extends the specication of
Model (3) with the real exchange term and is therefore labeled VECM, by analogy with vector
error-correction.
As with the Na ve ECM (Model 2) a plausible convergence speed close to 3% per month is
estimated. Other coecients conform to standard results and folk wisdom. The positive coecient
on the lagged change in the nominal exchange rate of 0.12 suggests a modest but statistically
signicant momentum eect. The positive coecient on the lagged interest dierential, closer to
+1 than  1, conforms to the well known forward discount puzzle: currencies with high interest
rates tend to appreciate all else equal. The positive coecient on the ination dierential conforms
to recent research ndings that \bad news about ination is good news for the exchange rate"
(Clarida and Waldman 2007): under Taylor rules, high ination might be expected to lead to
monetary tightening and future appreciation.
We can see that these models oer some improvement as compared to the Na ve ECM (Model
2). The R2 is higher and the explanatory variables are statistically signicant. They also perform
better than either na ve model as judged by actual returns. Their pooled mean forecast and actual















qj;t 1    qj { -0.0277**
(0.0047)
R
2, within 0.0164 0.0319
F F(3,2427) = 8.66 F(4,2426) = 14.36
Fixed eects Yes Yes
Periods 276 276















Std. dev. 0.0295 0.0294
Skewness -0.1464 0.1195
C.v. 6.5361 5.6245
y Statistics for trading prots are net, monthly, pooled.
Note: C.v. = coecient of variation = ratio of standard deviation to mean. Standard errors in parentheses;
** (*) denotes signicant at the 95% (90%) condence level. Estimation is by ordinary least squares.
returns are about half as high again. For actual returns, the coecients of variation (the ratio of
the sample variance to sample mean) are lower. Hence, their Sharpe ratios are higher, although
still very small. For the VAR the monthly Sharpe is 0.15 (0.53 annualized), and for the VECM
it is 0.18 (0.63 annualized). Even more notable, negative skews are much lower. VAR delivers an
actual pooled return skew of  0:15 and the VECM actually turns in a slightly positive skew of
0:12. Statistically the VECM is preferred with R2 and F-statistic twice as large, and the coecient
on the lagged real exchange rate highly signicant. From a trading standpoint its performance is
also a little better, with mean returns and Sharpe ratio up slightly. Still, 50 bps per month and an
annualized Sharpe of 0.63 may be viewed as somewhat disappointing. However, the key nding is
that when trades are made conditional on deviations from FEER, actual trading returns have a
skew that is zero or mildly positive.
102.4 A Nonlinear Model
Are these the best models we can nd? We think not, due to the limitations of linear models. We
present two arguments that force us to reckon with potential nonlinearities in the exchange rate
dynamics.
The rst possible reason for still disappointing performance in the VECM (Model 4) is that
the model places excessively high weight on the raw carry signal emanating from the interest
dierential in some risky \high carry" circumstances. This may lead to occasional large losses,
even if it is not enough to cause negative skew. Recall that na ve Model (2) placed zero weight on
this signal as part of an exchange rate forecast, whereas here the weight is 0.76. We conjecture
that the true relationship may be nonlinear. Here we follow an emerging literature which suggests
that deviations from UIP are corrected in a nonlinear fashion: that is, when interest dierentials
are large the exchange rate is more likely to move against the na ve carry trade, and in line with
the ecient markets hypothesis (see, inter alia, Bilson 1981; Flood and M. P. Taylor 1996; Coakley
and Fuertes 2001; Sarno, Valente and Leon 2006).
The second possible reason for disappointing performance might be related not to nonlinear
UIP dynamics, but rather nonlinear PPP dynamics. Here it is possible that VECM places too
little weight on the real exchange rate signal in some circumstances, e.g. when currencies are
heavily over/undervalued and thus more prone to fall/rise in value. Here again, we build on an
increasingly inuential literature which point out that reversion to Relative PPP, largely driven
by nominal exchange rate adjustment, is likely to be more rapid when deviations from FEER are
large (see, inter alia, Obstfeld and Taylor 1997; Michael, Nobay and Peel 1997; Taylor, Peel, and
Sarno 2001).
To sum up, past empirical ndings suggest that the parameters of the Na ve ECM Model
(2) may be expected to dier between regimes with small and large carry trade incentives, as
measured by the lagged interest rate dierential; and also to dier between regimes with small
and large FEER deviations, as measured by the lagged real exchange rate. In addition to these
arguments for a nonlinear model, the important role of the third moment in carry trade analyses
also bolsters the case, given the deeper point made in the statistical literature that skewness cannot
be adequately addressed outside of a nonlinear modeling framework (Silvennoinen, Ter asvirta and
He, 2008).
To explore these possibilities we extend the framework further to allow for nonlinear dynam-
ics. We rst perform a test against nonlinearity of unknown form and nd strong evidence of
nonlinearity derived from the absolute magnitudes of interest dierentials and real exchange rate
deviations. We then implement a simple nonlinear threshold error correction model (TECM).
For illustration, we employ an arbitrarily partitioned dataset with thresholds based on median
absolute magnitudes.
Table 4 presents the nonlinearity tests using Model (4) in Table 3, the VECM model, where
the candidate threshold variables are the absolute magnitudes of the lagged interest dierential
jij;t 1   i
j;t 1j and the lagged real exchange rate deviation jqj;t 1    qjj. Although more specic
nonlinearity tests tailored to particular alternatives would be more powerful, we are already able to
11Table 4: Nonlinearity Tests
Hypothesis tests Test statistic
H0: Nonlinear in jij;t 1   i

j;t 1j and jqj;t 1    qjj versus:
(a) H1: Nonlinear in jqj;t 1    qjj and F(44,2337) = 4.28
linear in jij;t 1   i

j;t 1j p = 0.0000
(b) H2: Nonlinear in jij;t 1   i

j;t 1j and F(52,2337) = 1.42
linear injqj;t 1    qjj p = 0.0262
(c) H3: Linear in jij;t 1   i

j;t 1j and F(96,2337) = 28.04
linear in jqj;t 1    qjj p = 0.0000
Notes: p refers to the p-value for the LM test of the null of linearity against the alternative of nonlinearity
based on a polynomial expansion of the conditional mean with the selected threshold arguments. See
Granger and Ter asvirta (1993).
forcefully reject the null with generic forms of neglected nonlinearity by simply taking a polynomial
expansion of the linear terms based on the threshold variables. This type of approach is often
used in testing against linearity when a smooth transition regression (STAR) model is specied
but it is clearly not limited to this alternative hypothesis (see Granger and Ter asvirta 1993). The
regression test takes the form of an auxiliary regression involving polynomials of each variable, up
to the fourth power.
The results in Table 4 show the hypothesis of linearity can be rejected at standard signi-
cance levels for specications based on whether either or both threshold variables are considered
simultaneously. Thus our VECM Model (4) in Table 3 appears to be misspecied, and so we are
moved to develop a more sophisticated yet parsimonious nonlinear model. For illustration, we
use a simple four-regime TECM, where the regimes are delineated by thresholds values arbitrarily
taken to be the median levels of the absolute values of the regressors Ij;t 1 = jij;t 1   i
j;t 1j and
Qj;t 1 = jqj;t 1    qjj. For simplicity these thresholds will be denoted by i and q respectively.
Estimates of this model, denoted Model (5) in Table 5, show that from both an econometric
and a trading standpoint, the performance of the nonlinear model is outstanding. It also accords
with many widely recognized state-contingent FX market phenomena.
We see from Panel (a) in Table 5 that the estimated model coecients dier sharply across the
four regimes. The null of no dierences across regimes is easily rejected. In Column 1 of Table 5 we
see that the model performs rather poorly in the regime where both interest dierentials and real
exchange rate deviations are small. Still, there is weak evidence for a self-exciting dynamic with a
very strong forward bias: the coecient on the interest dierential is large (+2.5) consistent with
traders attracted by carry incentives bidding up the higher yield currency. However, for small
interest dierentials, we can see from Column 3 in Table 5 that this eect disappears, once large
real exchange rate deviations emerge. Still, the t of the model remains quite poor in Column 3
also.
In Column 2 of Table 5, where the interest dierential is above median, this self-exciting
property is also manifest clearly, with a coecient of +1.8 that is statistically signicant at the
5% level. The results strongly suggest that wide interest dierentials take exchange rates \up
the stairs" on a gradual appreciation away from fundamentals. Of course, for given price levels
or ination rates, such dynamics quickly cumulate in ever-larger real exchange rate deviations,
12Table 5: Noninear Model
Model (5)
NECM
(a) Model parameters Qj;t 1 < q Qj;t 1 < q Qj;t 1 > q Qj;t 1 > q
(by regime) Ij;t 1 < i Ij;t 1 > i Ij;t 1 < i Ij;t 1 > i
Dependent variable ejt ejt ejt ejt
ej;t 1 0.0637 0.1228** 0.1029* 0.2027**
(0.0417) (0.0494) (0.0574) (0.0567)
ij;t   i

j;t 1 2.5033** 1.7790** 0.8707 -0.5734
(1.1577) (0.6379) (1.3585) (0.7811)
jt   

jt 0.6731 0.3836 -0.5269 0.1331
(0.4101) (0.3880) (0.3945) (0.2173)
qjt    qj -0.0572** -0.0564** -0.0146** -0.0364**
(0.0011) (0.0265) (0.0072) (0.0077)
R
2, within
F F(4,642) F(4,549) F(4,554) F(4,641)
= 4.63 = 4.29 = 1.90 = 8.60
Fixed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Periods 276 276 276 276
Currencies (relative to US$) 9 9 9 9
Observations (by regime) 655 562 567 654
















y Statistics for trading prots are net, monthly, pooled.
Note: C.v. = coecient of variation = ratio of standard deviation to mean. Standard errors in parentheses;
** (*) denotes signicant at the 95% (90%) condence level. Estimation is by ordinary least squares.
moving the model's regime to Column 4 in Table 5, where the t of the model is best, as shown by
a high R2 and F-statistic. And here the dynamics dramatically change such that the exchange rate
can rapidly descend \down the elevator": the lagged real exchange rate carries a highly signicant
convergence coecient of 3.6% per month, working against previous appreciation of the target
currency, and reverse exchange rate momentum then snowballs, with the lagged exchange rate
change carrying a now signicant and large coecient of 0.2.
In addition to being the preferred model based on statistical tests, does the nonlinear TECM
Model (5) in Table 5 deliver better trading strategies? Panels (b){(d) in that table suggest so.
Compared to the VECM Model (4) in Table 3, predicted and actual pooled prots are higher still,
13and nearing 60 bps per month. The pooled actual returns Sharpe ratio is now 0.19 monthly (0.67
annualized). This model's annual Sharpe ratio is the best yet, although it is still well below the
annual 1.0 Sharpe ratio benchmark commonly cited as the relevant hurdle for investors. Finally
we note that the TECM actual returns are strongly positively skewed: again, crashes are largely
avoided.
2.5 Portfolio Strategies
The performance of a pooled set of trades for the na ve, linear, and nonlinear models shows
how model performance can be improved. But these statistics bear no relation to actual market
activity. In reality, traders do not pick a random currency pair each period in which to trade.
Instead, currency funds invest in a portfolio of currencies. This allows funds to take advantage of
gains from diversication: standard statistical intuition (cf. the Central Limit Theorem) tells us
that variance and skewness can be curtailed by taking an average of draws that are imperfectly
correlated.20 (Here, for example, N = 9 so the standard deviation of prots for equal-weight
portfolio trades will be one third that of the underlying set of pooled trades.)
As a practical matter for many trading strategies studied in the academic literature, and
some used in practice, the portfolio choice is restricted|for reasons of simplicity, comparability,
diversication and transparency.21 The simplest restriction is to employ simple equal-weight
portfolios where a uniform bet of size $1=N is placed on each of N FX-USD pairs, so that the only
forecast-based decision is the binary long-short choice for each pair in each period. Granted, lifting
this restriction to allow adjustable portfolio weights must, ipso facto, allow even better trading
performance, at least on backtests. But from our standpoint of presenting a puzzle|rejecting the
null of the ecient market hypothesis, and showing a strategy with high returns and Sharpes, and
low skewness|meaningful forecasting success even when restricted to an equal-weight portfolio is
evidence enough to support our story.
Table 6 illustrates the gains from diversication strategies and shows how these gains deliver
very promising returns in cases where our FEER based models are employed. In each panel we
report mean, standard deviation, skewness, coecient of variation, and annual Sharpe ratios for
the na ve models, the linear models, and the nonlinear model. (Annual Sharpe is computed as
monthly Sharpe times
p
12.) In all cases the U.S. dollar is the base currency, as before.
Here we hypothetically wager $1/N on each currency trade, for the N currencies, with the
long-short direction for each currency given by the model's predicted return. This is called the
equal-weight portfolio. For these portfolios we construct summary statistics as before, plus an
annual Sharpe ratio. The performance of the portfolio-based trading strategies is revealing. It is
clear that some of the advantage of the VAR and the VECM models (3) and (4) over the na ve
models starts to wane once many currencies are traded, but the nonlinear TECM retains some
clear advantages by better avoiding currencies with high unconditional crash potential.
Consider rst the Na ve Model (1) in Table 2 and the VAR Model (3) in Table 3, without any
20 A numerical illustration is provided by Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2008).
21 Indeed, recent research suggests that variable \optimal" portfolio weights may not deliver meaningful gains
over the simple 1=N strategy (DeMiguel, Garlappi, and Uppal 2009).
14Table 6: Portfolio Performance
Monthly trading prots for equal-weight portfolios
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Na ve Na ve ECM VAR VECM TECM
Observations 276 276 276 276 276
Mean 0.0026 0.0034 0.0045 0.0052 0.0057
Std. dev. 0.0154 0.0163 0.0159 0.0169 0.0155
Skewness -1.8793 0.2472 -0.1019 1.0994 1.0704
Kurtosis 11.3818 3.9371 4.0890 8.1154 8.1316
C.v. 5.8764 4.8622 3.5318 3.2354 2.7357
Sharpe ratio, annualized* 0.5895 0.7125 0.9808 1.0707 1.2663
* Statistics for trading prots are net, monthly, except for annualized Sharpe ratio.
Note: C.v. = coecient of variation = ratio of standard deviation to mean.
real FEER fundamental. Gains from diversication are obvious right away as compared with the
pooled data presented earlier. Under equal-weight portfolios, the Na ve Model attains an annual
Sharpe of 0.59 but the VAR now has an annual Sharpe of 0.98. However, these portfolio strategies
are still rather undesirable given their low returns of 26{34 bps per month and negative skew.
In contrast, the linear models of the Na ve ECM Model (2) in Table 2 and the VECM Model
(4) in Table 3 do a very good job in the portfolio setting in purging unwanted skewness from actual
returns. The Na ve ECM has weak positive skew, and VECM has weak negative skew. Returns
are 45{52 bps per month, and the annualized Sharpe ratios are 0.71 and 1.07 respectively, thus
clearing the mythical 1.0 hurdle.
The superiority of the TECM model is now very clear, as shown by the nal column of Table
6. In equal weight form, it outshines all other models on mean return (57 bps per month) and
annualized Sharpe (1.27).22;23
2.6 Exploring the Performance Improvements
We now start to examine why our proposed model renements generate improved performance
and, as we do so, we shall begin to shift the focus of the analysis to out-of-sample performance,
which will be the centerpiece of our empirical work in section 3.
We look at both in and out-of-sample evidence, and the sample reserved for out-of-sample
evaluation was chosen to run from January 2004 to December 2008. For these purposes, one step-
ahead forecasts are generated, one at a time, with a rolling window that begins with the January
1986 observation and nishes with the December 2003 observation. Table 7 shows that the model
renements do very little to increase the ability of the trader to pick a protable direction for a
trade over and above the Na ve carry strategy. In sample, the random walk exchange-rate model
22 Even if the entire portfolio churns once per month, which it does not, and assuming typical G10 bid-ask
spreads of 2 bps for a round trip, these returns would be 55 bps and 82 bps, respectively, with miniscule downward
revisions in the Sharpe ratios even after allowance for transaction costs.
23 Further tweaks are possible to enhance performance even further. If equal weights are replaced by weights
proportional to the signal strength, the TECM model achieves returns (84 bps per month) and an annualized
Sharpe ratios (1.48) that are even more impressive, without negative skew. The improvements occur because the
linear weighting allows the model to re-weight towards more high risk/return trades with negative skew, without
turning the overall skew signicantly negative.
15Table 7: Fraction of Protable Trading Positions Correctly Called (%)
(a) In sample
Na ve Na ve ECM VAR VECM TECM
Australia 62.9 57.5 56.6 55.5 55.9
Canada 57.8 52.0 56.6 55.9 54.8
Germany 52.0 53.1 55.9 54.0 56.3
Japan 58.2 53.8 61.0 59.9 56.3
New Zealand 63.3 59.3 62.1 57.7 58.8
Norway 57.1 55.3 57.4 56.6 58.1
Sweden 62.7 50.6 66.2 66.2 62.4
Switzerland 53.8 54.5 58.1 55.1 58.1
UK 53.1 54.9 49.3 53.3 53.9
Pooled 57.9 54.6 58.1 57.1 57.1
(b) Out of sample
Na ve Na ve ECM VAR VECM TECM
Australia 55.0 48.3 53.3 45.0 58.3
Canada 43.3 51.7 50.0 46.7 51.7
Germany 45.0 46.7 48.3 51.7 45.0
Japan 56.7 56.7 65.0 66.7 56.7
New Zealand 61.7 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0
Norway 46.7 46.7 58.3 58.3 48.3
Sweden 53.3 53.3 56.7 60.0 60.0
Switzerland 53.3 55.0 53.3 53.3 55.0
UK 45.0 50.0 51.7 51.7 45.0
Pooled 51.1 52.0 55.2 54.8 53.3
Note: In sample is 1987 to 2008, out of sample is 2004 to 2008 recursive.
gets the direction of 58% of trades right, but what is striking is that the other models do no better.
The TECM also achieves 58%. Out of sample, the ndings are similar: the Na ve model got the
direction right 51% of the time, the TECM 53%. So what is so great about the rened models?
The answer is given in Table 8 and explored in much more detail in the next section. It is not
the ability to more often pick the right direction of trades that matters; it is the ability to pick
the right direction on trades that result in large gains or losses. In other words, there is a huge
dierence between a currency forecasting model with good overall t, and one that makes money.
This is a classic example of being careful not to judge models by an inappropriate criterion, or
neglecting to note that a good model in this context is one that \ts where it matters" in the data
space (Hand and Vinciotti 2003; Jord a and Taylor 2009).
For simplicity, Table 8 compares just the Na ve and TECM models. In-sample (panel a) we
nd that over 2438 pooled trades, the two models agreed on direction 1547 times and disagreed
891 times. When in agreement, returns were 65 bps per month, Annual Sharpe was 0.83 and skew
was  0:23. The worst trade lost 11% in a month, the best gained 12%. But when the models took
opposite sides, the dierences were stark. The Na ve model collected negative returns of 42 bps,
the TECM just the opposite. Annual Sharpes were  0:44 versus 0.44. Skew was  0:97 versus
0:97. Na ve suered a worst trade of 17%, but the TECM had that on the plus side. TECM's
worst month was only a 7% loss, and that was Na ve's best. These results explain why overall,
the TECM did better: it avoided crashes, and when extreme returns were likely it was better able
to pick the right side of the trade. Overall returns in TECM were 57 versus 26 bps per month for
16Table 8: When Does the TECM Model Outperform the Na ve Model?
(a) In sample N mean s.d. Sharpe skew min max
All trades pooled
Na ve 2438 0.0026 0.0297 0.3032 -0.6926 -0.1773 0.1180
TECM 2438 0.0057 0.0293 0.6691 0.3674 -0.1100 0.1773
Models agree
Na ve 1547 0.0065 0.0270 0.8345 -0.2272 -0.1100 0.1180
TECM 1547 0.0065 0.0270 0.8345 -0.2272 -0.1100 0.1180
Models disagree
Na ve 891 -0.0042 0.0329 -0.4387 -0.9740 -0.1773 0.0744
TECM 891 0.0042 0.0330 0.4427 0.9694 -0.0744 0.1773
(b) Out of sample N mean s.d Sharpe skew min max
All trades pooled
Na ve 539 -0.0025 0.0315 -0.2721 -1.0580 -0.1773 0.1038
TECM 539 0.0028 0.0315 0.3033 0.7006 -0.1056 0.1773
Models agree
Na ve 373 0.0002 0.0278 0.0254 -0.3700 -0.1056 0.1038
TECM 373 0.0002 0.0278 0.0254 -0.3700 -0.1056 0.1038
Models disagree
Na ve 166 -0.0085 0.0379 -0.7765 -1.4338 -0.1773 0.0736
TECM 166 0.0085 0.0379 0.7765 1.4338 -0.0736 0.1773
Note: In sample is 1987 to 2008, out of sample is 2004 to 2008 recursive. The Sharpe ratio is annualized.
Other statistics are monthly.
Na ve, Annual Sharpe was 0.67 versus 0.30, and skew was +0:37 versus  0:69.
The out-of-sample results in Table 8 panel (b) apply to the period of the credit crunch and
great carry trade crash of 2008. These results only amplify the point further. Mean returns were
not that dierent here, 28 versus  25 bps per month but they were at least up for TECM. Sharpe
was +0.30 versus  0:27. Skew was the dramatically dierent factor in the crisis period: +0:70 for
TECM versus  1:17 for the Na ve model.
To sum up, after several stages of renement, our preferred TECM model surmounts the
objections usually raised to justify excess returns to carry trades. The crudest, na ve long-short
carry trade strategies, even with currency diversication, deliver Sharpe ratios well below investors'
benchmark 1.0 threshold and crash-ridden returns displaying marked negative skew. But by
conditioning on the real exchange rate and allowing for nonlinearity, our TECM portfolios deliver
high returns with a Sharpe ratio 25%{50% above the conventional hurdle for an unexploited risky
arbitrage opportunity.
3 Predictive Ability Evaluation
Is this all too good to be true? Out-of-sample predictive ability testing is the gold standard
by which the success or failure of many models in economics is judged. The literature on the
ability to predict exchange rates spawned by Meese and Rogo (1983) has been particularly
savage on the eld: time and again the invincible random walk has emerged victorious against
an onslaught of ever more sophisticated economic/econometric models of the exchange rate. The
models investigated in the previous section are promising suitors but they must now face rigorous
17scrutiny.
The approach that we pursue in this section builds on some standard predictive ability measures
and brings in other techniques that are quite new in economics. Moreover, rather than just
evaluating the ability to predict exchange rates per se, we are interested in evaluating a model's
ability to generate attractive prots that have high Sharpe ratios and low skewness.
Recall our denition of ex-post nominal excess returns of a long FX position (with currency
index j now suppressed for clarity):
mt+1 = et+1 + (i
t   it)
which we labeled momentum and let b mt+1denote the one-period ahead forecast. Since (i
t   it)
is known at time t; then the only source of uncertainty comes from the prediction of et+1: In
practice, the position an actual trader takes (i.e., determining which currency to borrow in and
which to invest in) depends on the sign of b mt+1 for which we dene the dichotomous variable
b dt+1: This variable takes the value of 1 if b mt+1 > 0 and  1 otherwise, so that realized returns can
be dened as
b t+1 = b dt+1mt+1:
Setting the forecasting problem up as a binary choice or direction problem makes sense on a
couple of dimensions. First, as a statistical matter, making successful continuous exchange rate
(and hence, return) forecasts is a harder challenge, as those working in the Meese-Rogo tradition
have shown; but a directional forecast sets a lower bar, one that recent work suggests could be
surmountable (Cheung, Chinn, and Garcia Pascual 2005). Second, it is all that is needed in the
case of equal-weight currency portfolios. Thirdly, directional forecasting is important for traders.
Like other funds, currency strategies face the risk of redemptions or closure if negative returns
are frequent and/or large. It is nice to pick the bigger winners, rather than just small ones, but
not if the strategy risks blowing up. The point is only amplied when funds are leveraged. Thus
from a trader's point of view, what is often most important is the ability to correctly predict
the protable direction of the carry trade and for this reason we introduce methods designed to
evaluate a model's ability to correctly classify the data according to direction.
In this section we examine the directional predictive ability of our preferred models in two
ways. First, we evaluate the quality of the binary signal itself using new techniques from signal
detection theory. We then evaluate the performance of trading strategies based on the binary
signal, using loss-function methods that can go beyond the prevalent RMSE criterion and instead
be adapted to metrics of investment performance of interest to traders, like returns, Sharpe, and
skewness.
3.1 Hits and Misses: The ROC Curve
Forecasts of a binary outcome are called classiers. The biostatistics and engineering literatures
provide techniques, rarely used in economics, for the statistical evaluation of models for classica-
tion (see Pepe, 2003 for a survey). Specically, the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve
18characterizes the quality of a forecasting model and its ability to anticipate correctly the occur-
rence and non-ocurrence of pre-dened events.24 For greater detail, we refer readers to another
paper where we discuss and develop ROC techniques to evaluate investment performance (Jord a
and Taylor 2009).
In our problem the directional outcome variable is dt+1 = sign(mt+1) 2 f 1;1g; the ex-post
protable direction of the currency investment. Let the variable b t+1 to be a scoring classier such
that for a given threshold c; b t+1 > c is taken to indicate b dt+1 = 1; and b t+1  c corresponds to
b dt+1 =  1 instead. Our classier will be the predictions of the conditional means obtained with
the models in Tables 2{5, so that b t+1 = b mt+1 but in what follows we maintain the more generic
notation b t+1:
Let TP(c) denote the true positive rate dened as P[b t+1 > cjdt+1 = 1]; sometimes also called
sensitivity or recall rate, and in the more familiar Neyman-Pearson nomenclature, 1 minus the
Type II error, or the power of the test (the test here being the ability to correctly identify dt+1 with
h(b t+1); for any strictly monotonic function h(:)). Let FP(c) denote the false positive rate dened
as P[b t+1 > cjdt+1 =  1] which is 1 minus the specicity or the Type I error, or the size of the
test. Then the ROC curve is dened as the plot of TP(c) against FP(c) for values of c 2 ( 1;1):
Notice that when c = 1; TP(c) = FP(c) = 0 and when c =  1 then TP(c) = FP(c) = 1 so
that the ROC curve can be displayed in [0;1]  [0;1] space.
The 45-degree diagonal line corresponds to the ROC curve of a uninformative classier, where,
for any given observation, at any threshold, there is a 50-50 chance of correctly classifying the
direction of trade. In this context, the 45-degree line corresponds to the natural null of the ecient
markets hypothesis: on average, protable trades cannot be predicted better than a coin toss and
the classier contains no information at any threshold. This is a natural benchmark in our analysis.
Intuitively, the \better" a classier is, the closer the ROC curve is to the ideal classier that hugs
the left and top edges of the unit square (and the further away it is from the 45-degree line). We
now apply a formal test based on this intuition.
The area under the curve (AUC) measures the probability that the classier for an observation
whose outcome is dt+1 = 1 attains a higher value than that for an observation whose outcome
is dt+1 =  1; that is P[b 
+
t+1 > b 
 
t+1] and where the superscript denotes the sign of the true
outcome. Thus, the AUC ranges from 0.5 to 1, since for a simple coin toss the probability
described previously would be 0.5. (Should any classier deliver an AUC less than 0.5, its forecast
could simply be inverted!)25
As an illustration using our data, Figure 1 shows a ROC graph. The ROC is displayed for the
case of directional forecasts for the New Zealand dollar only, for the preferred TECM model, with
24 The origin of the ROC curve can be traced back to radar signal detection theory developed in the 1950s and
1960s (Peterson and Birdsall, 1953), and its potential for medical diagnostic testing was recognized as early as 1960
(Lusted, 1960). More recently, ROC analysis has been introduced in psychology (Swets, 1973), in atmospheric
sciences (Mason, 1982), and in the machine learning literature (Spackman, 1989).
25 The AUC statistic is closely related to the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (WMW) U statistic of equality between
classiers by the relation: U = n+n (1   AUC) where n+ refers to those observations for which dt+1 = 1; n 
refers to those observations for which dt+1 =  1; and U is asymptotically normal. Thus, AUC provides a second
and more convenient non-parametric test for the quality of a classier with respect to the coin toss and, in practice,
it is the summary statistic commonly reported in ROC analysis. The U statistic is also known to be robust to
heteroskedasticity (Conover 1999).







































0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
False Positive Rate
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Notes: In-sample predictions using TECM Model. Sample: Apr. 1986 to Dec. 2008. Area under the
curve for this case: AUC = 0.6531 (s.e.=0.0335, z=4.5673, p=0.0000).
in-sample predictions. In this case, the AUC is about 0.65 and statistically signicantly dierent
from the coin toss with a p-value of 0.0000. Obviously, we could generate a ROC graph for each
model, country and sample|90 graphs in all|but this is clearly impractical. Instead we pool
the data, and Table 9 shows the pooled AUC, in- and out-of-sample, for a concise summary. All
models appear informative for the in sample case; but the results are weaker for the na ve models
in the out-of-sample case. However, the VAR, VECM and TECM all deliver impressive out-of-
sample z-scores that exceed 2 surmount the 5% signicance level to reject the ecient markets
null. By these criteria, G10 currency returns are clearly forecastable at a one month horizon, in
a directional sense, at very high levels of statistical signicance using our modeling approach.
3.2 Gains and Losses: The Return-Weighted ROC* Curve
The ROC analysis shows that our model is a good classier of optimal direction. However, correctly
classifying the direction of the trades without regard for the returns or losses generated by the
classication is insucient. For example, Tables 7 and 8 showed that although the TECM model
does not pick winners any better than some simpler specications, it is able to avoid large losses
20Table 9: Area Under the ROC Curve
Model AUC s.e. z-score p-value
(a) In Sample
Na ve 0.5905 0.0115 7.85 0.0000
Na ve ECM 0.5604 0.0116 5.19 0.0000
VAR 0.5996 0.0115 8.67 0.0000
VECM 0.5935 0.0115 8.11 0.0000
TECM 0.6084 0.0114 9.47 0.0000
(b) Out of sample
Na ve 0.5170 0.0249 0.68 0.4949
Na ve ECM 0.5245 0.0249 0.99 0.3236
VAR 0.5654 0.0247 2.65 0.0081
VECM 0.5778 0.0246 3.17 0.0015
TECM 0.5541 0.0247 2.19 0.0284
Notes: In sample is 1987 to 2008, out of sample is 2004 to 2008 with recursive estimation. The AUC
statistic is a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney U-statistic with asymptotic normal distribution and its value
ranges from 0.5 under the null to a maximum of 1 (an ideal classier). See Jord a and Taylor (2009).
responsible for negative skewness in the distribution of returns. Thus, a classier that correctly
pinpoints 10 trades with low returns but misses a key trade that generates a devastating loss will
be less desirable than a classier that is equally accurate on average but correctly classies the
large events.
For this reason, Jord a and Taylor (2009) introduce a novel renement to the construction of
the ROC curve that accounts for the relative prots and losses of the classication mechanism.26
We proceed in the spirit of gain-loss measures of investment performance (Bernardo and Ledoit
2000) by attaching weights to a given classier's upside and downside outcomes in proportion to
observed gains and losses. This alternative performance measure will give little weight to right or
wrong bets when the payos are small; but when payos are large it will penalize classiers for
picking trades that turn out to be big losers, and reward them for picking big winners.
To keep the new curve normalized to the unit square, consider all the trades where \long FX"
was the ex-post correct trade to have made. The maximum gain from classifying all these trades





Now consider all the trades where \short FX" was the ex-post correct trade to have made. Sim-






We can now redene, or rescale, the true positive and false positive rates TP(c) and FP(c) in
terms of the upside and downside returns m actually achieved, relative to the maximally attainable
gains and losses thus dened. For any given threshold c, this leads to new statistics as follows:
26 A similar improvement to ours is the instance-varying ROC curve described in Fawcett (2006).
21Table 10: Area Under the Return-Weighted ROC* Curve
Model AUC* s.e. z-score p-value
(a) In Sample
Na ve 0.5690 0.0116 5.94 0.0000
Na ve ECM 0.6060 0.0114 9.26 0.0000
VAR 0.6291 0.0113 11.42 0.0000
VECM 0.6496 0.0112 13.41 0.0000
TECM 0.6769 0.0109 16.21 0.0000
(b) Out of sample
Na ve 0.4355 0.0246 -2.62 0.0087
Na ve ECM 0.4961 0.0249 -0.16 0.8747
VAR 0.5720 0.0246 2.92 0.0034
VECM 0.6052 0.0243 4.37 0.0000
TECM 0.5912 0.0244 3.73 0.0002
Notes: In sample is 1987 to 2008, out of sample is 2004 to 2008 with recursive estimation. The AUC*
statistic is a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney U-statistic with asymptotic normal distribution and its value









The plot of TP(c) versus FP(c) is then, by construction, limited to the unit square, and
generates what we term a returns-weighted ROC curve, which is denoted the ROC* curve. As-
sociated with the ROC* curve is a corresponding return-weighted AUC statistic, denoted AUC*.
Intuitively, if AUC* exceeds 0.5 this is evidence that the classier outperforms the coin toss null
from a return-weighted or gain-loss perspective. Detailed derivation of these statistics and their
properties are provided in Jord a and Taylor (2009), along with techniques for inference.
Using these return-weighted statistics strongly reinforces our argument that classiers based
on our more rened models (VECM/TECM) are informative; in contrast the performance of the
more na ve models are not statistically distinguishable from the coin-toss null. Table 10 collects
summary AUC* statistics for the same in- and out-of-sample periods discussed in Table 9.
The AUC* statistics are higher than the corresponding AUC statistics reported in Table 9,
and the z-scores attained are much higher too. The VECM and TECM appear to perform better
than the other less rened models, with TECM ahead in sample, and VECM slightly ahead out
of sample, although the condence intervals for the AUC measures are overlapping in these cases
so there is not much to distinguish them.
Clearly, both of these models are unambiguously better than the coin toss, with a p-value of
0.0001 or less in all cases. This is perhaps to be expected: as we have shown earlier, the major
benet of the models presented here is not the better overall t, but enhanced ability to get on
the right side of big moves|and the weighted ROC* measure is ideally suited to provide evidence
for this advantage. For completeness, Figure 2 shows the ROC* curve for New Zealand that
complements the ROC curve in Figure 1. There are no substantive dierences|the curves have a
similar, slight asymmetric pattern, although in this case as well the AUC* attains a higher value
than the AUC in Figure 1.
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Notes: In-sample predictions using TECM Model. Sample: Apr. 1986 to Dec. 2008. Area under the
curve for this case: AUC* = 0.6631 (s.e.=0.0347, z=4.6941, p=0.0000)
3.3 Beyond RMSE: Trading-Based Predictive Ability Tests
The ROC-based tests suggest that our preferred directional models are informative, at least in
terms of getting the sign correct more often than a coin toss. But this is not the only perfor-
mance metric of interest. Do any of our models generate meaningful improvement from a trader's
perspective? And are some better than others in this regard? In this section we propose some
exible tests of predictive ability for use in this setting.
Extant tests designed to assess the marginal predictive ability of one model against another
are based, generally speaking, on a comparison of the forecast loss function from one model to the
other. Such is the approach proposed by the popular Diebold and Mariano (1995) and West (1996)
frameworks and subsequent literature, with the usual choice of loss function being the root-mean
squared error (RMSE). Yet, as we have noted, overall t isn't the only, or even the best criterion
for evaluating arbitrage possibilities.
The approach that we pursue is to consider a variety of loss functions and use a framework
that naturally extends our ROC based analysis. For this purpose we generate a series of out-of-
sample, one-period ahead forecasts from a rolling sample of xed length. It is clear that in this
23type of set-up, estimation uncertainty never vanishes and for this reason we adopt the conditional
predictive ability testing methods introduced in Giacomini and White (2006). These tests have the
advantage of permitting heterogeneity and dependence in the forecast errors, and their asymptotic
distribution is based on the view that the evaluation sample goes to innity even though the




t=R denote the loss function associated with the sequence of one step-
ahead forecasts, where R denotes the xed size of the rolling estimation-window from t = 1 to
T   1; and let i = 0;1 (with the index 0 indicating forecasts generated with the unit root null






d ! N(0;1) (4)
























(since E(L) = 0 under the null. See theorem 1 in Giacomini and White, 2006); and where
P = T   R + 1.
The exibility in dening the loss function permitted in the Giacomini and White (2006)
framework is particularly useful for our application. The framework extends naturally to a panel
context, where the forecasts for N dierent currencies over P periods are pooled together. In
that case, assuming independence across units in the panel we may implement the above test with
the observation count P replaced by NP. Because one may suspect that the panel units are not
independent, we implement a cluster-robust covariance correction however.










t+1   mt+1)2;i = 0;1
where b mi
t+1 = Et(mt+1jModel= i) for i = 0;1: Thus, one can assess whether dierences in RMSE








But even if RMSE is a major focus of the academic literature, it is of little interest to those
in nancial markets, since models with good (poor) t measured by RMSE could still generate
poor (respectively, good) returns (Jord a and Taylor 2009). So what about investors' preferred
24Table 11: Forecast Evaluation: Loss-Function Statistics for Pooled Data
RMSE RTN SR SK
(100) (annual %) (annual) (monthly)
(a) In sample, 1987{2008
Na ve 2.93 3.23 1.08 -0.77
NECM 2.91 4.16 1.32 0.06
VAR 2.89 5.42 1.83 -0.26
VECM 2.87 6.46 2.19 0.24
TECM 2.83 7.35 2.42 0.34
(b) Out of sample, 2004{2008
Na ve 2.23 -2.84 -1.01 -1.00
NECM 2.22* -0.80 -0.21 -0.36
VAR 2.21 2.23* 0.72 -0.17*
VECM 2.20 3.70* 1.22 0.44*
TECM 2.20 3.27* 0.92 0.64*
Notes: * indicates the GW statistic against the Na ve null based on the corresponding loss function,
is signicant at the 95% condence level. To correct for cross-sectional dependence, a cluster-robust
covariance correction is used. See text.
performance criteria? Fortunately, the exibility of the framework allows one to consider loss
functions based on alternative metrics. Three natural ways to assess the advantages of dierent
models from the perspective of the trades they generate are as follows:
























































t+1 for i = 0;1: Thus, this Sharpe ratio measures the out-of-sample
risk/return prole of the carry trade strategies implied by competing forecasting models, whereas
the skewness coecient allows us to assess the models' ability to avoid infrequent but particularly
large negative returns. The associated loss functions are derived as in the case of the RMSE and
summarized in the appendix for completeness.
Table 11 summarizes the full in-sample and the out-of-sample loss functions: RMSE (in per-
cent); Annualized Return (in percent); Annualized Sharpe Ratio; and the monthly Skewness
25coecient for each of the models in Tables 2, 3, and 5; that is the Na ve (null); the Na ve ECM;
the VAR, the VECM; and the TECM models. For panel (b), which contains the out-of-sample
results, an asterisk indicates that the Giacomini-White (2006) statistic associated to the loss func-
tion in that column is signicant at the conventional 95% condence level (as compared to the
Na ve model in row 1). Results for pooled month-year observations are shown. The results in
column 1 show that the dierence in the models as judged by RMSE are miniscule. However,
measured by metrics that matter to traders, the dierences are considerable. For example, in our
preferred model, in-sample the dierence in annual mean returns is +3.23 for Na ve versus +7.35
percent for TECM. Out-of-sample the period includes the period of carry trade crashes, and the
dierence is  2:84 versus +3:45 percent (panel b). Annual Sharpe Ratios for pooled returns are
boosted from +1.08 to +2.42 in-sample, and from  1:01 to +0:92 in the turbulent out-of-sample
period. Skewness improves from  0:77 to +0:34 in-sample, and from  1:0 to +0:64 out-of-sample.
There is little doubt which of these returns a currency hedge fund manager would have preferred.
The GW tests also show that, with the exception of skewness, these performance improvements
are statistically signicant, out-of-sample, relative to the Na ve model.
4 Alternative Crash Protection Strategies
In this section we compare the merits of our fundamentals-based model with the recent literature,
where two alternative crash protection strategies have emerged. The rst is a contract-based
strategy: Burnside, Eichenbaum, Kleshchelski, and Rebelo (2008ab) explore a crash-free trading
strategy where FX options are used to hedge against a tail event that takes the form of a collapse
in the value of the high-yield currency. The second is a signal based strategy: Brunnermeier et al.
(2008) argue that an important cause of carry trade crashes is the arrival of a state of the world
characterized by an increase in market volatility or illiquidity.
4.1 Options
In Burnside, Eichenbaum, Kleshchelski, and Rebelo (2008ab) a na ve carry trade strategy is the
starting point. Traders go long the high yield currencies and short the low yield currencies. The
focus is also on major currencies, as here, although the sample window goes back to the 1970s
era of capital controls, and applies to a larger set of 20 currencies. Returns may be computed for
individual currencies, portfolios, of for subsets of currencies (e.g., groups of 1, 2 or 3 highest yield
currencies against similar groups of lowest yield currencies). However, each na ve strategy can be
augmented by purchase of at-the-money put options on the long currencies.27
This augmentation leads to positive skew by construction. It averts tail risk, but at a price.
How large is that price? For the 1987/1 to 2008/1 period a na ve unhedged equally-weighted carry
trade had a return of 3.22% per annum with an annualized Sharpe ratio of 0.54 and a skewness of
-0.67. This compares with the U.S. stock market's 6.59% return, 0.45 Sharpe ratio, and skewness
of -1.16 over the same period. Normality of returns is rejected in both cases.
27 This strategy is also studied by Bhansali (2007).
26Implementing the options-based hedged carry trade boosts the Sharpe ratio a little, eliminates
the negative skew, but at a signicant cost. Added insurance costs of 0.71% per annum mean that
the hedged strategy lowers returns to only 2.51% annually, has a Sharpe of 0.71, and a signicant
positive skew of 0.75. Thus on an annualized basis the hedged strategy costs 80 bps, and still fails
to bring the Sharpe close to the mythical 1.0 hurdle.
In contrast, let us now compare our similar equal-weight na ve carry trading strategy with our
nonlinear fundamentals-based return-forecast strategy, in Table 6, panel (a). Comparing Models
(1) and (5), our strategy increases returns from 29 to 46 bps per month, and still eliminates
negative skew. For comparison, on an annualized basis, the return rises from 3.45% to 5.55%, a
gain of 210 bps, with a Sharpe ratio of 1.34. Unlike the options-based strategy, our approach can
increase returns and lower skew at the same time.
We make some further observations. To be fair, we recognize that the strategies implemented
by Burnside, Eichenbaum, Kleshchelski, and Rebelo (2008ab) are crude and mainly illustrative.
The options they employ are at-the-money, and push skew into strong positive territory. In
reality, investors might purchase option that are more out-of-the-money; at much lower costs, this
could protect against only the large crashes, yet still eliminate the worst of the negative skew
(Jurek 2008). Nonetheless, even if lower cost option strategies are found, our results suggest that
there is a better no-cost way to hedge against crashes by using data on deviations from long-run
fundamentals, and this information also serves to boost absolute returns and Sharpe ratios too.
Moreover, options contracts have other drawbacks, many of which were shown to be salient issues
after the nancial crash of 2008. Option prices embed volatility, so in periods of turmoil the price
of insurance can rise just when it is most needed, depending on the implied FX volatility (Bhansali
2007). And as with all derivatives, options carry counterparty risk. In addition, options price and
position data from exchanges may not be representative, since this activity represents only a
tiny fraction of FX option trading, the vast majority being over-the-counter. Also, like forwards
and futures derivatives, options carry bid-ask spreads that can explode such as to make markets
dysfunctional in crisis periods. Finally, whilst Burnside, Eichenbaum, Kleshchelski, and Rebelo
(2008ab) show the viability of an options-based strategy for 20 widely-traded major currencies,
FX derivative markets are thin to nonexistent for many emerging market currencies, and bid-
ask spreads can be wide, so in those markets currency strategists may have to seek alternative
plain-vanilla approaches, like ours, that might help avert currency crash risk.
4.2 VIX Signal
In Brunnermeier et al. (2008) it is argued that various forms of generalized asset market distress,
by reducing risk appetite, may be signicant contributors to carry trade crashes.28 The logic of the
argument is that such conditions may prompt a pull back from all risky asset classes, leading to
short-run losses via order ow eects, or the price impact of trades. To provide empirical support
for this proposition the authors show that, on a weekly basis, changes in the VIX volatility index
(a proxy for distress) correlate with the returns to na ve carry trade strategies|that is, trading
28 Melvin and M.P. Taylor (2009) also examine nancial stress as a predictor of carry trade prots.
27strategies which do not condition on any information except the interest dierential. An increase in
VIX was found to correlate with lower carry trade returns, all else equal, suggesting that liquidity
risk might partially explain the excess returns. However, lagged changes in VIX had little or no
predictive power for next periods returns. This prompts us to explore whether the same arguments
hold true in our sample, and if we detect any dierence when we use our preferred trading strategy.
We found that in our data, using the same 1992{2006 sample period, at a monthly frequency, there
was no evidence that the change in VIX was correlated with returns contemporaneously, nor that
it helped predict next period's returns.
Specically, in the spirit of Brunnermeier et al. (2008), we compute \loadings" by regressing
our returns on the contemporaneous and lagged change in VIX. We rst regressed the actual
(signed) returns of trades based on the na ve model on the contemporaneous change in VIX for all
months and all currencies in our data over their sample period 1992{2006. We then did the same
for the lagged change in VIX. We then re-ran both regressions using the actual (signed) returns of
our preferred TECM model. In none of the four regressions was the slope coecient signicant,
and in all cases it actually had the \wrong" positive sign, suggesting that rising VIX was slightly
positively correlated with prots this month, or next month.
We make some further observations. To be fair, we should note that Brunnermeier et al. (2008)
present these results at a weekly frequency. In our dataset, we have to work at monthly frequency
given the underlying price index data used to construct the real exchange rate fundamental signal.
We conjecture that the VIX signal may have stronger correlations with current or future returns at
weekly or even fortnightly frequency, even when placed in a model like ours augmented to account
for real exchange rate fundamentals, although further research is warranted in this area.
If the sample is extended using our full dataset, including through the volatile crisis period
in 2007{2008, the coecients are not stable and we do sometimes nd a statistically signicant
role for VIX signals in predicting negative actual (signed) returns of the na ve Model 1, although
this episode is outside the window considered by Brunnermeier et al. (2008). But this result
disappears, and the sign even reverses, when we include the real exchange rate term and use our
preferred TECM model, suggesting that the real exchange rate deviation alone may serve as an
adequate crash warning. In fact, in these models the sign of the coecient on the change in
VIX was often positive and signicant, suggesting potentially the opposite interpretation: when
VIX is rising, arbitrage capital may be being withdrawn, but this has a tendency to leave more
prots on the table for the risk tolerant, or \patient capital," and for traders pursuing protable
fundamental-based strategies with inherent skew protection of the sort developed here.
5 Reality Check: Exchange Traded Funds
Do our models relate in any way to actual market outcomes? Beyond out-of-sample forecasting,
an alternative way to judge our preferred modeling and trading strategies against the na ve bench-
mark is to compare the recent performances of dierent currency funds in the real world. When
comparing the merits of na ve versus fundamentals-based strategies, the relative performance of
these funds in the nancial crisis 2008 proves to be very revealing.
28First, we seek a fund representative of the na ve long-short approach, the basic carry strategies
of Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2008), and the same authors with Kleshchelski (2008ab),
henceforth BER/K. For this purpose we focus on the Deutsche Bank G10 Currency Harvest USD
Index (AMEX: DBCFHX, Bloomberg: DBHVG10U). This index has been constructed back to
March 1993 using historical data. Since April 2006 this index has been made available to retail
investors|in the United States, for example, it trades as the Powershares DB G10 Currency
Harvest Fund (AMEX: DBV). These indices track a portfolio based on 2:1 leveraged currency
positions selected from ten major \G10" currencies with the U.S. dollar as a base.29
This ETF's na ve approach to forecasting any currency pair via the carry signal matches the
BER/K approach. The main dierences are that the index is not equal weight and tries to pick 6
winners out of 9, the fund's leverage is nite and so this fund has to pay the opportunity costs of
satisfying the margin requirement, and the fund also charges a 0.75% per annum management fee.
The performance of the index in the period 2003 to 2008 is shown in Figure 3, where the starting
value of the index is rebased to 100. The rst four years, up to mid/late 2007 were a golden age
for na ve strategies: the index return was about 10% per year, and the index peaked over 140 in
mid-2007. Even after some reversals, as late as the middle of 2008 the index stood at 130, and
was up 30% on January 2003 levels.
Based on a similar, strong performance by their trading strategy through mid-2007, the virtues
of a na ve carry trade strategy, protected only by cross-currency diversication, were praised by
Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2008, 588):
It is much less obvious what particular peso problem can explain the high Sharpe
ratio associated with the equally weighted carry trade. That strategy seems to involve
\picking up pennies in front of an unknown truck that has never been seen."
Unfortunately, in the second half of 2008 the Na ve-BER/K type of carry trade strategies were
hit by the nancial equivalent of a runaway eighteen-wheeler. The index gave up about 10% in
the third quarter and a further 20% in October in a major unwind. After all that the index stood
below its January 2003 level of 100, and four and a half years of gains had been erased.
Could a more sophisticated carry trade strategy have avoided this carnage, whilst still pre-
serving positive returns overall? Yes. To see this we now look for a dierent index which matches
better with our more sophisticated trading strategy. We focus on the Deutsche Bank Currency
Returns USD Index (Bloomberg: DBCRUSI). This investible index operates on the same set of
\G10" currencies but amalgamates three dierent trading signals for each currency, where again
the signals are +1 (long), 0 (no position), and {1 (short). The rst signal is the same as before: the
na ve carry trade signal based purely on the interest rate, the 3-month LIBOR rate (The \Carry
Index"), updated every three months. The second signal is based a calculation of the deviation of
that currency from its FEER level, based on continuously updated common-currency price levels
29 Technically, as explained in the DBV prospectus, for every $1 invested, the index goes long (+$1 total) in the
three currencies with the highest interest rates, and short ($-1 total) in the three with the lowest interest rates,
and with 0 invested in the other three, with $1 placed in Treasuries as margin. The portfolio is reweighted only
every quarter and is implemented via futures contracts. If the U.S. dollar is one of the long or short currencies,
that position makes no prot in the base currency and is dropped, so leverage falls to 1.66.



























































































































































Carry + momentum + PPP strategy
Notes: The ETFs are based the Deutsche Bank G10 Currency Harvest USD Index (DBCFHX) and
Deutsche Bank Currency Returns USD Index (DBCRUSI). The indices predate the ETF inception dates.
from the OECD (The \Valuation Index") updated every three months. The third signal is based
on momentum, and takes into account the USD return to holding that currency in the previous
period (The \Momentum Index") updated every month. Clearly this augmented carry strategy
is much closer in spirit to our augmented models, given its mix of signals. In our model \carry"
corresponds to the lagged interest dierential; \momentum" corresponds mostly to the lagged
exchange rate change (given persistence in the interest dierential); and \valuation" corresponds
to our monthly real exchange rate deviation.
The Deutsche Bank Currency Returns index is not currently available as an exchange traded
fund in the U.S., but it is traded as an ETF in Frankfurt. A test of our approach is to ask:
did investors in this more sophisticated fund fare better in 2008 than those invested in the na ve
DBV fund. As Figure 3 shows, they did much better. On the 2003{07 upswing this index was
less volatile, but returns were still strong, up about 28% at the peak. Momentum signals got
the money quickly out of crashing currencies (and back in when they rose), and valuation signals
hedged against dangerously overvalued currencies (and jumped in otherwise), tempering the na ve
carry signal. The real test was in 2008. The index did remarkably well: performance was absolutely
at returns, and kept 20% of the cumulative gains locked in. Looking at the three components of
this strategy, a 30%+ loss on the carry signal in 2008, was oset by a 10% gain on the PPP signal
30and a 20% gain on the momentum signal.
Notice how the relative performance of these ETFs closely matches the results of our trading
strategies as shown back in Table 7. In the out of sample results the Na ve-BER/K type model
showed a loss of 2.84% per year from 2004 to 2008. Our more sophisticated VECM showed a gain
of 4.15% per year. That dierential of 7% per year would cumulate to a roughly 30% divergence
in index values over a four year period. Despite some dierences in methods between our model
simulations and the ETFs, this is almost exactly the cumulative divergence seen for the real-world
ETFs in Figure 3.
Fundamentals matter. Comparing the two ETFs makes clear the gains from using a more
sophisticated currency strategy incorporating a FEER measure. Although academic research has
focused on the na ve strategies, it is no secret in the nancial markets that more rened models,
taking into account the signals discussed here and many others, are actively employed by serious
fund managers and are now leaking out into traded products.30
6 Conclusion
The international nancial crisis of the second half of 2008 eectively undid the majority of the
persistent carry trade returns observed during the previous ve to ten years. Strategies based on
arbitraging interest rate dierentials across countries under the belief that it was equiprobable for
exchange rates to appreciate or depreciate displayed consistently positive average returns. But
these returns were volatile and subject to occasional crashes (negative skewness). It could be
argued then, that the observation of persistent carry trade returns does not violate the ecient
markets hypothesis.
This paper instead shows that more sophisticated strategies that incorporate information about
the fundamental equilibrium exchange rate can deliver positive returns with high Sharpe ratios
and zero or even mildly positive skewness. We do not claim to be better at forecasting exchange
rates than the ubiquitous random walk model according to the yardstick in Meese and Rogo
(1983). We claim that we can predict better than the toss of a coin the direction of the carry
trade that will produce positive returns. Our results indicate that this is no in-sample uke and
in fact, a thorough out-of-sample analysis that includes the turbulent period of the second-half of
2008, rearms the robustness of our claims. Moreover, the historical performance of real-world
ETFs during this period (discussed in the previous section) corroborates our ndings.
In addition to these ndings, our paper makes two contributions to the empirical assessment
of the directional predictive potential of alternative investment strategies. On the one hand, we
adapt formal predictive ability tests with loss functions that better represent those characteristics
that are most important to an investor, which do not necessarily correspond with those that have
been traditionally important to an econometrician. Moreover, we introduce in this paper new
techniques commonly used in biostatistics, the ROC curve and associated statistics, that are of
considerable utility for investors. In a companion paper we have extended the discussion of the
techniques introduced here in several dimensions. For instance, among some of the topics we cover,
30 For example, in addition to the Deutsche Bank ETs, see also the FX Currents from Goldman Sachs.
31we discuss how to evaluate more sophisticated trading strategies that allow for long-short-cash
positions (Jord a and Taylor 2009).
We believe that there is more work to be done that builds on the foundations of this paper.
In this paper we have considered simple portfolio strategies based on equal weights, but clearly
strategies that exploit the time-varying correlation structure across countries beg for more so-
phisticated portfolio designs. Similarly, a lesson from the ROC analysis introduced in this paper
is that directional prediction can be ne-tuned to reect the marginal trade-os between return,
volatility, and skew encapsulated in each investor's preferences.
More broadly, we view this paper as having introduced carry trade strategies that are still
simple|but not na ve|with risk and return characteristics that challenge conventional views
about the rewards to risk in currency markets. It is natural to expect that when others test the
EMH in these markets, they will have to address the ndings that we have uncovered here.
Appendix
The loss functions of the Giacomini-White (2006) statistic in expression (4) corresponding to each of the
three trading-based metrics, and each model i = 0;1, are, for returns:
L
i
t+1 = b 
i
t+1;i = 0;1;
















and for skewness, we use Pearson's second denition of skewness to provide a comparable scale with the






















i(0:50) refers to the median of b 
i
t+1 for t = R;:::;T   1: The cluster correction that we use for
the panel consists in computing the covariance matrix of the loss function dierence across countries and
standardizing by the inverse of its Cholesky decomposition.
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